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Constitutional Law

Gingrich, Desegregation, and Judicial
Supremacy
January 5, 2012

By Joel Alicea

Those who oppose judicial supremacy follow in the footsteps of Abraham
Lincoln himself.

Newt Gingrich’s statements about the judiciary during the December 15,
2011, GOP debate and on Bob Schie er’s Face the Nation the following
weekend ignited a restorm over his view of American constitutionalism
that has been smoldering in the media for several months now. His
challenge to judicial supremacy—the idea that the Supreme Court has the
last word on the meaning of the Constitution—has been much
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4491/
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condemned, particularly because Gingrich’s argument also criticizes the
declaration of judicial supremacy in the Court’s 1958 desegregation
decision, Cooper v. Aaron. Ian Millhiser of Think Progress was quick to accuse
the former Speaker of siding with the white supremacists of the 1950s
when Gingrich rst released his position paper on the judiciary in October.
Although the media’s breathless denunciations suggest otherwise, Gingrich
is not the rst public gure to challenge the Cooper Court’s assertion of its
supremacy over constitutional interpretation. Attorney General Edwin
Meese did the same in a 1986 lecture at Tulane University. Meese’s address
elicited a similarly angry response from the press, especially from
columnist Anthony Lewis, who made Cooper the centerpiece of his
appraisal of Meese’s speech. As was the case in 1986, the debate over
Cooper in the past few months has been confused, epitomized by the New
York Times’ recent suggestion that Gingrich’s critique of Cooper has
“disturbing racial undertones.” The Times and others misunderstand the
history and law of that famous case. Those who argue that the Supreme
Court is not the ultimate arbiter of the Constitution’s meaning need not
deny the fact that Cooper was rightly decided; they can and do celebrate
the courage of that opinion.
Cooper v. Aaron came to the Supreme Court under extraordinary
circumstances, the drama of which is matched by few instances in our
constitutional history. On the day before black students were to be
admitted to Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas, in compliance with
the local school board’s desegregation plan and the Court’s decision in
Brown v. Board of Education, Governor Orval Faubus ordered the state
national guard to surround the building and declare it “o limits” to blacks.
The governor’s actions precipitated a national crisis. President Eisenhower
ordered in the Army to ensure desegregation moved forward. Months
later, still in the midst of the crisis and at the request of the Little Rock
School Board, the federal district court overseeing desegregation in Little
Privacy - Terms
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Rock halted implementation of Brown, reasoning that more time was
needed before desegregation could proceed.
The stakes for the Supreme Court and the nation could not have been
higher. The virulent racism of Governor Faubus and the violence his actions
encouraged had led the district court to retreat from implementing Brown.
If the Supreme Court went along with the district court, if it lost its nerve at
this critical moment, the segregationists would win a crushing victory,
having intimidated the nation’s highest tribunal.
When the Supreme Court issued its opinion, it forcefully rejected the
reasoning of the district court. All nine justices held that black students’
constitutional rights “are not to be sacri ced or yielded to the violence and
disorder which have followed upon the actions of the Governor and
Legislature.” Because that violence and disorder were the basis for the
district court’s decision, the Supreme Court’s statement, as its opinion
acknowledged, was “enough to dispose of the case” and require
desegregation to continue.
But the Court went further. It sought to refute the constitutional theory
that served as the legal foundation of Arkansas’s resistance to Brown:
nulli cation. When the school board asked the district court to delay
implementation of desegregation, it did so in part because Governor
Faubus’s actions had led people to believe that “there was some power in
the State of Arkansas which, when exerted, could nullify the Federal law.”
The Court recognized that the legal argument in the case was
fundamentally about Arkansas’s assertion that it was not bound by the
Court’s decision in Brown because it had the right to determine for itself
what the Constitution meant.
Arkansas’s position was hardly novel. Based on the idea that states
retained their ultimate sovereignty when they agreed to the constitutional
compact and were the nal judges of whether that compact was being
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Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, which declared the Alien and Sedition Acts
unconstitutional. South Carolina likewise asserted the power to nullify
federal tari laws in 1832. That e ort was emphatically rejected by
President Andrew Jackson in his Proclamation to the People of South
Carolina. Jackson, as well as his nemesis Henry Clay, saw that the internal
logic of nulli cation, once accepted, permitted secession and disunion.
Their concerns were borne out later by the Civil War. That harrowing
con ict rmly established that the compact theory of the Constitution had
been rejected, having been “tried by war and decided by victory,” to quote
Abraham Lincoln. In its place stood a theory of America as an indissoluble
Union, as evidenced by historian James McPherson’s observation that
Americans ceased speaking of “the United States” in the plural and began
referring to it in the singular. The Union theory left no room for states to
judge for themselves whether to obey federal law. The Supreme Court
recognized this post-war consensus in the 1869 case of Texas v. White, in
which the Court held the following: “The act which consummated [Texas’s]
admission into the Union was something more than a compact; it was the
incorporation of a new member into the political body. And it was nal.”
The relation of this history, especially Jackson’s Proclamation and the
decision of the Civil War, would have su ced to settle the nulli cation
question presented by Governor Faubus, a question that was itself
extrinsic to the legal issue in Cooper and the judgment to proceed with
desegregation.
But the Court instead chose to answer the nulli ers by making a far bolder
and far less historically supportable claim: The justices made the striking
assertion that Marbury v. Madison “declared the basic principle that the
federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution,
and that principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the
Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system.” Because the judiciary is supreme in constitutional questions,
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according to the Cooper Court, and because states are bound by the
Constitution under Article VI, states must obey the judiciary’s decisions. The
Court’s statement has been widely viewed by scholars as an assertion that
the Court’s constitutional interpretations bind all levels of government,
including its co-equal branches of the federal government.
The scope of the Court’s statement was not tailored to its end. Cooper was
a case about enforcing federal law against the states. The Court need only
have claimed the power to bind the states to its decisions; there was no
need for the Court to assert its supremacy in constitutional interpretation
against Congress and the president. The second sentence of the Court’s
opinion makes it clear that the case “involve[d] a claim by the Governor
and Legislature of a State that there [was] no duty on state o cials to obey
federal court orders resting on this Court’s considered interpretation of the
Constitution.” Moreover, the Court’s statement was wholly super uous to
the legal issue in the case. Its rejection of Governor Faubus’s intimidation
tactics su ced to require desegregation to go forward. But the Court chose
to assert a far more sweeping power: the nal word on the meaning of the
Constitution for all levels of government.
It is this last claim—that the Court’s decisions bind Congress and the
president—to which Gingrich, Meese, and eminent scholars of varied
political a liation object. Nothing in this criticism tarnishes the courage or
rightness of the Court’s decision in Cooper. As the Court acknowledged, its
statement on judicial supremacy had no bearing on the outcome of the
case, and the history related above demonstrates that judicial supremacy
was unnecessary to rebut the legitimacy of nulli cation.
The real question is not whether opponents of the Court’s assertion of
judicial supremacy in Cooper applaud the outcome of the case; it is whether
supporters of judicial supremacy understand that their position places
them on the other side of Abraham Lincoln. It was Lincoln who, in response
to Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney’s opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford,
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rejected judicial supremacy in his rst inaugural address. Lincoln believed
that accepting judicial supremacy would mean that “the people will have
ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned
their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal.” He followed
through on his challenge to the Court by defying the Dred Scott decision
and issuing passports to free black citizens. How odd that those who follow
in the tradition of Lincoln should nd themselves accused of the sins of
Taney.

About the Author
JOEL ALICEA
A graduate of Princeton University and Harvard Law School,
Joel Alicea practices law in Washington, DC.

Privacy - Terms

https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2012/01/4491/

6/6

